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Abstract
Is more intense product market competition and imitation good or bad for
g r o w t h ?T h i sq u e s t i o ni sa d d r e s s e di nt h ec o n t e x to fa ne n d o g e n o u sg r o w t h
model with “step-by-step” innovations, in which technological laggards must
ﬁrst catch up with the leading-edge technology before battling for techno-
logical leadership in the future. In contrast to earlier Schumpeterian models
in which innovations are always made by outsider ﬁrms who earn no rents
if they fail to innovate and become monopolies if they do innovate, here
we ﬁnd: ﬁrst, that the usual Schumpeterian eﬀect of more intense product
market competition (PMC) is almost always outweighed by the increased in-
centive for ﬁrms to innovate in order to escape competition, so that PMC has
a positive eﬀect on growth; second, that a little imitation is almost always
growth-enhancing, as it promotes more frequent neck-and-neck competition,
but too much imitation is unambiguously growth-reducing. The model thus
points to complementary roles for competition (anti-trust) policy and patent
policy.
We thank, without wishing to implicate, Jan Boone, Amy Glass, Pravin
Krishna, Jim Peck, Steve Redding, John Van Reenen, two anonymous refer-
ees, and seminar participants at Tel-Aviv, Harvard, Rochester, Brown, Ohio
State and Jerusalem, for helpful comments on earlier drafts.1 Introduction
Is more intense competition good or bad for innovation and growth? The
Schumpeterian branch of endogenous growth theory has generally addressed
these questions by focusing on the monopoly rents that accrue to a success-
ful innovator. Thus, by reducing the ﬂow of rents, more product market
competition (PMC) should reduce incentives for innovation and growth (for
example, see Aghion and Howitt, 1992 or Caballero and Jaﬀe, 1993).1 Sim-
ilarly, easier imitation and weaker patent protection should diminish R&D
incentives by reducing the expected duration of rents from innovation (see
Zeng, 1993 or Davidson and Segerstrom, 1998).2
Of course, the incentive to perform R&D depends not on the rents of a
successful innovator per se, but rather on the innovator’s incremental rents;
that is, the diﬀerence between the rents of a successful innovator and an
unsuccessful one. This distinction does not arise in most Schumpeterian
models, in which innovations are made by outsider ﬁrms who earn no rents
if they don’t innovate, and who become local monopolists if they do. An
incumbent monopolist does not innovate in these models because of the Ar-
row (replacement) eﬀect; since it is already enjoying monopoly rents it has
a weaker incentive than outsiders, so that if the R&D technology exhibits
constant returns to scale and the incumbent has no R&D advantage, it will
choose not to perform R&D in equilibrium (see Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
A new innovator becomes a monopolist in its own industry because of the
(implicit) assumption of undiﬀerentiated Bertrand competition within each
innovative sector.
In reality, however, most innovative activity occurs within industries com-
1One exception is Peretto (1999), which we discuss later in this section.
2Segerstrom (1991) found that a subsidy to imitation could raise growth, but Davidson
and Segerstrom show that the equilibrium analyzed in that model is unstable and not
unique. Also, the conventional wisdom with respect to imitation is not generally borne out
by product-cycle models in which imitation takes place in low-wage countries (the South)
while innovation takes place in the North. (Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Helpman, 1993,
Glass, 1999, Glass and Saggi, 1999). We do not deal with the open-economy mechanisms
involved in these papers.
1prising more than one ﬁrm, and within existing ﬁrms that are already earning
rents. Thus the rents of a successful innovator may be a poor indicator of
the incentive to innovate. For example, more PMC might reduce a ﬁrm’s
pre-innovation rents by more than it reduces post-innovation rents. Indeed,
this is what one would expect as a result of the “selection eﬀect”3 of market
competition; that is, a more competitive industry is one in which the proﬁts
earned by the industry’s technology leader are larger relative to other ﬁrms
in the industry. Thus an increase in PMC can stimulate R&D by increasing
the incremental proﬁt from innovating, that is, by strengthening the motive
to innovate in order to escape competition with “neck-and-neck” rivals, even
though it may reduce the industry’s overall level of absolute proﬁts. If this
motive is important it would help reconcile the Schumpeterian paradigm with
recent empirical work (e.g. by Nickell, 1996 or Blundell et al., 1995) pointing
to the possibility of a positive correlation between PMC and productivity
growth within a ﬁrm or industry.4
Also, a ﬁrm that is imitated may face a larger incentive to innovate than
before, even though its prospective rents from an innovation are lower than
before, because it is now in neck-and-neck competition with a technologically
equal rival and will remain so until it innovates again. So, for example, even
if a relaxation of patent protection reduces the R&D eﬀort of a ﬁrm with any
given lead size it might still raise the economy’s growth rate by forcing more
ﬁrms into the neck-and-neck situation in which they are induced to spend the
most on R&D. More generally, anti-trust policy (which directly aﬀects PMC)
and patent legislation (which aﬀects the ease of imitation) aﬀect growth not
only through their direct eﬀect on innovation incentives in each individual
industry but also through their “composition eﬀect,” that is, through their
inﬂuence on the cross-industry distribution of technological gaps and the
3The term ”market selection” originates with Vickers (1995). See also Boone (1999)
and Aghion and Schankerman (2000) for applications of this notion to the economics of
innovation.
4This “escape competition” motive has been pointed out in previous theoretical work
on innovation, for example by Mookherjee and Ray (1991) in the context of a one-sector
model in which a dominant ﬁrm adopts new innovations at discrete moments in time, and
where the newest technology diﬀuses at an exogenous rate to a competitive fringe; in this
paper, an increase in the rate of diﬀusion may sometimes speed up innovations by the
dominant ﬁrm by strenghening the motive to escape from the fringe.
2corresponding distribution of incremental rents, and in particular on the
frequency of a zero gap.
The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the question posed at the
outset, by addressing it in a framework where innovations are undertaken by
incumbent ﬁrms, where the above mentioned “escape competition” motive for
R&D is operative, and where composition eﬀects are at work. Speciﬁcally,
we portray technological progress as emerging from a dynamic process of
“step-by-step” innovation, along the lines of Harris and Vickers (1987) and
Budd et al. (1993): ﬁrst, instead of monopolistic competition we assume
that each industry is characterized by duopoly; second, because ﬁrms face a
rising marginal cost of R&D, therefore R&D will be conducted simultaneously
by both incumbent ﬁrms in an industry; third, a technological laggard in
any industry cannot leap-frog the existing leader in that same industry: it
must ﬁrst catch up with the current leader before racing for technological
leadership in the future. This, in turn, implies that in a positive fraction
of industries competition will be neck and neck and therefore the escape
competition eﬀect will be strong.
A precursor paper by Aghion et al. (1997) considered the eﬀects of im-
itation and product market competition on growth, using the same basic
framework as in this paper. However, the analysis in that paper was lim-
ited to the simple case where the technological gap between ﬁrms cannot
exceed one step; furthermore, when discussing the impact of product market
competition on growth, it focused on the comparison between Cournot and
Bertrand competition. The present paper extends the analysis in Aghion et
al. (1997), ﬁrst by not imposing any kind of restriction on the size of techno-
logical gaps across industries, i.e on the set of possible industry structures,
and second by using a continuous parametrization (in terms of the substi-
tutability between duopolistic products within each industry) to measure the
degree of product market competition (PMC). We thus derive more precise
results and predictions regarding the eﬀects of PMC and imitation on the
long-run industry structure (as measured by the distribution of technological
gaps in steady-state equilibrium) and the long-run average growth rate.
Our paper is related to other papers in the Schumpeterian growth litera-
3ture that allow innovations by incumbent producers. Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995, ch.7) and Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999) allow incumbents to have a
cost advantage over outside ﬁrms, but do not examine the eﬀects of PMC on
growth. Thompson and Waldo (1994) and Aghion et al. (1999) present mod-
els of monopolistic competition with no entry, in which PMC has the usual
Schumpeterian eﬀect unless additional assumptions are introduced into the
framework. Thompson and Waldo make an assumption about the size of
inter-industry spillovers guaranteeing that all ﬁrms have the same incentive
to innovate regardless of their technological lead or lag over other ﬁrms. In
the model of Aghion et al., all innovations are done by ﬁrms that are fur-
thest behind the technological frontier, and whose situation is therefore much
like that of an outsider; yet, whenever innovating ﬁrms face agency problems,
PMC can become growth-enhancing by forcing otherwise reluctant managers
to innovate in order to avoid costly bankruptcy.
Peretto (1999) presents a model of monopolistic competition with a deter-
ministic R&D technology that produces a continuous stream of cost-reducing
innovations at the ﬁrm level, and ﬁnds that PMC has a positive eﬀect on the
equilibrium level of innovation. In this model, unlike other Schumpeterian
models, R&D involves no spillovers, so that growth depends on R&D per
ﬁrm rather than aggregate R&D. An increase in PMC raises growth by re-
ducing an entrant’s prospective rents, which reduces the equilibrium number
of ﬁrms, which thus leads to more R&D per ﬁrm and hence more growth.
Also, since all ﬁrms are symmetric at all times, there are no composition
eﬀects at work.
Our paper also diﬀers from all of the above papers in that it portrays each
industry as being duopolistic, rather than assuming monopolistic competi-
tion. Thus we can examine the eﬀects of competition within each industry,
which is the focus of all anti-trust policy, rather than competition between
industries, which is all that one can consider with monopolistic competition.
Moreover, none of these other papers examines the eﬀect of imitation on
growth.
Our ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. With respect to PMC, we
ﬁnd that at least a little competition is always growth-enhancing. That is,
4starting from the minimal degree of PMC and holding constant the ease of
imitation, a marginal increase in PMC always raises the growth rate. For
most parameter values this positive ceteris paribus eﬀect of competition on
growth continues to hold as the degree of PMC rises to its maximal level
(at which there is perfect competition). When we allow both PMC and
imitation to be varied together we ﬁnd that the maximal growth rate is
always achieved by allowing the maximal degree of competition. Thus it
seems that the usual Schumpeterian eﬀect of more intense competition is
almost always outweighed by the increased incentive for ﬁrms to innovate in
order to escape competition.
With respect to imitation, we ﬁnd that a lot of it is always bad for growth.
That is, as the ease of imitation goes to inﬁnity the growth rate always falls to
zero. However, a little imitation is almost always growth-enhancing; holding
constant the degree of competition, the marginal eﬀect of raising the ease
of imitation above zero is almost always to raise the growth rate. The only
cases in which this does not hold are cases in which the degree of competition
is close to maximal. Thus the usual Schumpeterian eﬀect of imitation always
prevails for large propensities, but is usually outweighed by the composition
eﬀect of promoting more frequent neck-and-neck rivalry when the propensity
is not too large.
In short, our ﬁndings are that the eﬀect of PMC on growth usually is
monotonically positive, but sometimes is inverse-U shaped, whereas the ef-
fect of imitation on growth usually is inverse-U shaped but sometimes is
monotonically negative.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. The basic model is pre-
sented in section 2. It is similar to previous “quality ladder” models, but
with step-by-step technological progress instead of the more commonly as-
sumed leap-frogging, and with duopolies instead of monopolistic competition.
We then proceed to analyse the economy’s steady-state growth rate in three
stages, each corresponding to a diﬀerent range of values of the parameter γ
that represents the size of innovations. Section 3 analyses a two-state ex-
ample that approximates the case in which innovations are very large; this
example is simple enough to yield closed-form solutions. Section 4 studies
5the case in which innovations are very small, using the method of asymptotic
expansions around the point where γ = 1. Section 5 analyses the general
model and presents numerical results for intermediate values of γ. Section 6
concludes by suggesting possible extensions.
2 Basic model
2.1 Consumers
Consider an economy with a continuum of industries indexed by i ∈ [0,1].
There is a continuum (of total mass 1)o fi n ﬁnitely-lived consumers with
identical intertemporal preferences:
U =
Z ∞
0
{
Z 1
0
lnQi(t)di − L(t)}e
−rtdt, (1)
where Qi(t) denotes consumption at time t of industry i’s output, L(t)i s
labor supplied and r>0 is the rate of time preference.5
There are two ﬁrms in each industry i.L e tqAi and qBi respectively denote
the outputs of these two ﬁrms. Industry output is given by: Qi = f(qAi,q Bi)
where f(·) is a symmetric function that is homogenous of degree one in its
two arguments (and independent of i). Throughout the paper attention is
restricted to the particular case in which:
f(qAi,q Bi) ≡ (q
α
Ai + q
α
Bi)
1/α , α ∈ (0,1].
The parameter α measures the degree of substitutability between the two
goods in any industry.
The log-preference assumption made in (1) implies that in equilibrium
individuals spend the same amount on each basket Qi. W en o r m a l i z et h i s
5This preference speciﬁcation implies that labor supply is inﬁnitely elastic. The case
of inelastic labor supply is brieﬂy analyzed by Aghion et al. (1997), who suggest that
the resulting wage movements mitigate the eﬀect of competition on growth. Speciﬁcally,
more product market competition tends to increase the demand for both manufacturing
workers and R&D workers: the demand for manufacturing workers within each industry
should increase as this industry becomes more competitive and therefore produces more,
and the demand for R&D workers should go up as a result of the increased incentive
for neck-and-neck ﬁrms to escape competition. The resulting upward pressure on wages
should reduce the incremental rents of innovators, and therefore reduce their incentive to
innovate.
6common amount to unity by using expenditure as the numeraire for the
prices pAi and pBi at each date. Thus the representative household chooses
each qAi and qBi to maximize f(qAi,q Bi) subject to the budget constraint:
pAiqAi+pBiqBi = 1, and the demand functions facing the two ﬁrms in industry
i are:
qAi =
p
1
a−1
Ai
p
α
a−1
Ai + p
α
a−1
Bi
and qBi =
p
1
a−1
Bi
p
α
a−1
Ai + p
α
a−1
Bi
2.2 Product-market competition
Each ﬁrm produces using labor as the only input, according to a constant-
returns production function, and takes the wage rate as given. Thus the unit
costs of production cA and cB of the two ﬁrms in an industry are independent
of the quantities produced. Assume that the ﬁrms compete in prices, arriving
at a Bertrand equilibrium. According to the above demand functions, the
elasticity of demand faced by each ﬁrm j is ηj =( 1 − αλj)/(1 − α), where
λj = pjqj is the ﬁrm’s revenue:
λj =
p
α
α−1
j
p
α
α−1
A + p
α
α−1
B
,j= A,B (2)
Thus each ﬁrm’s equilibrium price is:
pj =
ηj
ηj − 1
cj =
1 − αλj
α(1 − λj)
cj,j= A,B (3)
and its equilibrium proﬁti s :
Πj =
λj
ηj
=
λj (1 − α)
1 − αλj
,j= A,B (4)
Equations (2) ∼ (4) can be solved for unique equilibrium revenues, prices
and proﬁts. Given the degree of substitutability α, the equilibrium proﬁto f
each ﬁrm j is determined by its relative cost z = cj/c−j; an equiproportional
r e d u c t i o ni nb o t hcA and cB would induce each ﬁrm to reduce its price in
the same proportion, which, because industry demand is unit-elastic, would
leave the equilibrium revenues and proﬁts unchanged. More formally, (2) ∼
(4) implicitly deﬁne a function φ(z,α)s u c ht h a t :
ΠA = φ(cA/cB,α)a n dΠB = φ(cB/cA,α). (5)
7The substitutability parameter α is our measure of the degree of prod-
uct market competition in each industry. Although α is ostensibly a taste
parameter, we think of it as proxying the absence of institutional, legal and
regulatory impediments to entering directly into a rival ﬁrm’s market by of-
fering a similar product. Under this interpretation α reﬂects in particular
the inﬂuence of anti-trust policy.
In our model α corresponds to standard measures of competition. For
example, it is a monotonically increasing transformation of the elasticity of
substitution in demand
¡
1
1−α
¢
between the two rivals’ outputs in any in-
dustry. Given a ﬁrm’s share λ of industry revenue, α is also a monotoni-
cally increasing transformation of the elasticity of demand 1−αλ
1−α faced by the
ﬁrm. Furthermore, given λ, α is a monotonically decreasing function of the
measure of market power used in the related empirical research by Nickell
(1996), namely the share of proﬁts in value added, which in this model is
(1 − α)/(1 − αλ).
The limiting case of α =0d e ﬁnes the minimal degree of competition; in
this case equations (2) ∼ (4) can still be solved for revenues, prices and proﬁts
even though the utility function (1)i sn o td e ﬁned. The opposite limiting
case of α = 1 is the case of Bertrand competition between undiﬀerentiated
products, which results in perfect competition when the two ﬁrms have the
same unit cost.
A ﬁrm engages in R&D in order to decrease its relative cost. According
to (5), the advantage of a cost reduction, and the disadvantage of a rival’s
cost reduction, depends on the degree of product market competition. Thus
to examine the eﬀects of competition on growth we need to characterize the
proﬁtf u n c t i o nφ.
In the appendix we demonstrate:
Proposition 1 For all z>0:(a)The function φ(z,α) is strictly decreasing
in z for all α ∈ (0,1); (b) φ(z,0) = 1/2;a n d( c )φ(z,α)+φ(1/z,α) >
2φ(1,α) for all α ∈ (0,1] except when z = 1.
Part (a) states that a lower relative cost is always strictly advantageous
to a ﬁrm, except perhaps in the extreme cases of zero or perfect competition
8(α =0o r1).
Part (b) states that when the degree of competition falls to zero a ﬁrm’s
proﬁt becomes independent of its relative cost; that is, when α =0e a c hﬁrm
faces a unit-elastic demand function, and produces an inﬁnitesimal amount
for an inﬁnite price, yielding a revenue equal to 1/2, at negligible cost, re-
gardless of cj. Because of this, the incentive to innovate vanishes when α =0 .
This is the key to our anti-Schumpeterian ﬁnding below to the eﬀect that
growth is enhanced, at least initially, by more competition.
Part (c) states that, when there is more than the minimal degree of com-
petition, total industry proﬁti sl o w e ri fﬁrms are neck and neck, with identical
costs, than if one ﬁrm has a relative cost advantage.
When α = 1 we have winner-take all competition with proﬁts determined
by:
φ(z,1)=
½
0i f z ≥ 1
1 − z otherwise
¾
. (6)
Also, for all α ∈ (0,1):
φ(0,α)=1 and lim
z→∞
φ(z,α)=0 , (7)
φ(1,α)=
1 − α
2 − α
, (8)
and
∂
∂z
φ(z,α)
¯
¯
¯
¯
z=1
= −
α
4 − α2. (9)
Results (6) ∼ (9) are derived in the appendix.
A ﬁrm’s unit cost depends on the level of its technology. Speciﬁcally,
cj = wΛ, where w is the economy-wide wage rate, and Λ is the ﬁrm’s unit
labor requirement. Moreover, our normalization assumption and the linearity
of utility in labor imply that w = 1.6 Thus cj = Λ.E a c h t i m e a ﬁrm’s
technology advances by one step, its unit labor requirement Λ falls by the
6The Hamiltonian of the representative household with wealth W can be expressed as:
H =l nC − L + λW(rW + wL− PC),
where C is aggregate consumption: lnC ≡
R 1
0 lnQidi,a n dP is its price. Our normalization
implies PC =1 . The ﬁrst-order conditions for an interior maximum with respect to C and
L are: 1/C = λWP and 1 = wλW. Hence w =1 .k
9factor γ > 1. Accordingly, the relative cost of a ﬁrm that leads its rival
technologically by n steps (or lags, if n<0) is z = γ−n.
Figure 1 shows how the ﬁrm’s proﬁt φ(γ−n,α) varies with size of its lead n
and the degree of competition α.7 It shows that, in accordance with parts (a)
and (b) of Proposition 1,p r o ﬁt is increasing in the ﬁrm’s lead, with a rate of
increase that vanishes as α approaches zero. As α increases, the relationship
between lead size and proﬁt turns into a logistic, which gets increasingly
sharp. Higher α reduces the proﬁto faf o l l o w e r( aﬁrm with n<0) and of a
neck-and-neck ﬁrm (with n = 0), but it can increase the proﬁto fal e a d e r( a
ﬁrm with n>0), especially if α and n are large.
Figure 1 here
Figure 1 reveals that the increase in a neck-and-neck ﬁrm’s proﬁtt h a t
would result from innovating and moving ahead by one step (φ(γ,α) − φ(1,α))
is strictly increasing in the degree of competition α. Thus the motive of es-
caping competition is potentially important for ﬁrms in the neck-and-neck
state, whose pre-innovation proﬁt is reduced by more than post-innovation
proﬁt when competition intensiﬁes.
In contrast, Figure 1 shows that the incremental proﬁto faﬁrm that
already has a sizeable lead
¡
φ(γ−(n+1),α) − φ(γ−n,α)w h e r en À 0
¢
can be
inverse U-shaped in α, and that the same is true of a follower ﬁrm, whose
incremental proﬁt from catching up with the leader8 is φ(1,α) − φ(γ−n,α),
where n<0. Thus in an industry with a large technological gap we might
expect an increase in competition to reduce the R&D eﬀort of both ﬁrms
when α approaches its maximal level, in accordance with the usual Schum-
peterian result. For when α becomes very large neither ﬁrm in such an
industry stands to make much immediate gain from innovating - - the leader
7Figure 1 was plotted assuming γ =1 .135. Varying γ would alter the scale of the
right-hand axis, without otherwise aﬀecting the shape of the curve.
8We assume that a ﬁrm that is n steps behind the leader in its industry can catch
up with a single innovation, rather than having to make n innovations. Becoming a
technological leader is still a step-by-step process, because it takes two innovations to go
from being a laggard to being a leader. Section 6 below discusses the alternative case
where the cost of catching up increases as the leader’s technological lead increases. This
alternative case produces results that are qualitatively similar to the case in which it takes
n innovations to erase an n-step lead.
10is already earning almost the maximum possible proﬁt and the follower will
still earn zero even if it catches up. However, when α is very small to begin
with, incremental proﬁts are increasing in α for all ﬁrms, and the motive to
escape competition is the dominant one, since all ﬁrms earn the same proﬁt
regardless of technology level when α =0 .
2.3 R&D and innovations
Innovative advance, and hence growth, happen at a rate determined by R&D
eﬀorts. Each industry is assumed to be duopolistic in respect of R&D as
well as production.9 By employing ψ(x) units of labor in R&D, a ﬁrm at the
technological frontier (either a leader or a neck-and-neck ﬁrm) moves one step
ahead with Poisson hazard rate x, and by employing ψ(x)u n i t so fl a b o ro n
R&D, a technological follower catches up with its rival at hazard rate (x+h),
where the R&D-cost function ψ(x) is an increasing and convex function of
R&D eﬀort x ≥ 0, and h ≥ 0 is a parameter that measures the ease of
imitation or R&D spillovers10. In parallel with our interpretation of α, we
interpret the “ease of imitation” h as proxying the absence of institutional,
legal and regulatory impediments (especially connected with patent laws and
regulations) that prohibit the direct use of rivals’ technological discoveries.
We focus on the symmetric stationary equilibria in Markov strategies, in
which each ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort depends only on its current technological state
(i.e. on the technological gap in the industry to which the ﬁrm belongs and
on whether the ﬁrm is a leader or a follower in that industry) and not on
9This duopolistic assumption is strong for two reasons at least. First, it implies that
innovations are only made by ﬁrms currently in the market. Second, it excludes another
interpretation of greater product market competition in terms of relaxing entry barriers
in a way that leads to an increased number of ﬁrms in the industry. However to some
extent the latter interpretation is captured by the comparison between the monopolistic
and duopolistic industry cases carried out in Aghion et al. (1997). In particular, the
analysis in that paper reveals that whenever the interest rate r is not too large, growth
is greater under duopoly than under monopolistic competition. More generally, allowing
for new entry would presumably reinforce the eﬀects of product market competition as
parametrized and analysed in the present paper.
10All our qualitative analytical results with respect to the eﬀects of competition and
imitation on growth would go through with minor alteration, if instead of exactly catching
up with the leader in the same industry, an innovating laggard acquired a small lead over
the current leader; in other words our results would essentially go through if we replaced
the step-by-step innovations with the assumption of a suﬃciently small leap-frogging.
11the ﬁrm, on the industry to which the ﬁrm belongs or on the time. Such
equilibria always exist in our model. Moreover they are unique when γ is
close to 1.( C f .B u d de ta l . ,1993) We also restrict attention to the case in
which the R&D-cost function is quadratic:
ψ (x)=βx
2/2, β > 0.
This restriction introduces no loss of generality into our analysis of the case
where γ is near 1, because the asymptotic expansions of Section 4 below do
not go beyond the third order. (Cf. Budd et al., 1993.) Moreover it ensures
that equilibrium is unique in the case where γ is large.11
Let x0, xn and xn denote respectively the R&D eﬀorts of a neck-and-
neck ﬁrm, a leader in an industry with gap n ≥ 1 a n daf o l l o w e ri ns u c h
an industry, and let V0, Vn and V n denote the expected present value of
their respective proﬁts. Since the equilibrium rate of interest is the rate of
time preference r, the value Vn can be derived heuristically from the Bellman
equation:
Vn =m a x
x
{(πn − βx
2/2)dt +
e
−rdt[xdtVn+1 +( xn + h)dtV0 +( 1 − xdt − (xn + h)dt)Vn]},
where the R&D eﬀort xn of the follower is taken as given by the leader.
In words, the value of currently being a technological leader in an industry
with gap n at date t equals the discounted value at date (t + dt), plus the
current proﬁt ﬂow πndt, minus the current R&D cost (βx2/2)dt,p l u st h e
discounted expected capital gain from making an innovation and thereby
moving one further step ahead of the follower, minus the discounted expected
capital loss from having the follower catch up.
For dt small, e−rdt ∼ 1 − rdt and the second-order terms in (dt)c a nb e
ignored. Then the above equation can be rewritten as:
rVn = πn + xn(Vn+1 − Vn)+( xn + h)(V0 − Vn) − β(xn)
2/2. (10)
11There are other cases in which equilibrium is unique. For example, it is unique when r
is large, h is large or β is large, even without the special choice for the R&D-cost function.
(Cf. Budd et al., 1993.)
12Similarly, one can derive the Bellman equations for V n and V0:
rV n = πn + xn(V n+1 − V n)+( xn + h)(V0 − V n) − β(xn)
2/2. (11)
and:
rV0 = π0 + x0
R&D eﬀort of rival.
(V1 − V0)+
z}|{
x0 (V 1 − V0) −β (x0)
2 /2. (12)
Each ﬁrm will choose its R&D eﬀo r ts oa st om a x i m i z et h er i g h t - h a n d
size of its Bellman equation. Thus each R&D eﬀort is strictly proportional
to the incremental value that would result from innovating:12
xn =( Vn+1 − Vn)/β,( 13)
xn =
¡
V0 − V n
¢
/β, (14)
and:13
x0 =( V1 − V0)/β.( 15)
Equations (10) ∼ (15) solve recursively for the sequence {xn, xn+1, Vn,
V n+1}n≥0.
2.4 Steady-state industry structure
Let µn denote the steady-state fraction of industries with technological gap
n ≥ 0. We naturally have:
X
n≥0
µn = 1. (16)
Stationarity implies that for any technological gap n (“state n”) the ﬂow of
industries into state n must equal the ﬂow out.C o n s i d e r ﬁrst state 0 (the
“neck-and-neck” state). During time interval dt,i nµn(xn + h)dt industries
with technological gap n ≥ 1 the follower catches up with the leader; hence
the total ﬂow of industries into state 0 is:
X
n≥1
µn(xn + h)dt.
12We can ignore corner solutions when deriving (13) ∼ (15) because the incremental
value is never negative.
13To derive (15), note that when choosing its R&D eﬀort x0 optimally, each neck-and-
neck ﬁrm takes as given the R&D eﬀort of its rival, which also equals x0 in a symmetric
Markov equilibrium.
13On the other hand, in µ0(2x0)dt neck-and-neck industries one ﬁrm acquires
a lead, hence the total ﬂow of industries out of state 0 is 2µ0x0dt. Thus:
2µ0x0 =
X
n≥1
µn(xn + h). (17)
Replicating the same reasoning for state 1 and then for states n ≥ 2
yields:
µ1(x1 + x1 + h)=2 µ0x0 (18)
and
µn(xn + xn + h)=µn−1xn−1,n≥ 2. (19)
2.5 Steady-state growth rate
Let Y denote aggregate output, deﬁned by: lnY =
R 1
0 lnQidi. The econ-
omy’s growth rate is g = d
dt lnY. Since each lnQi follows an independent
and identical stochastic process, the growth rate g equals the asymptotic
growth rate of each sector: g = lim
∆t→∞
∆lnQi
∆t . An industry i is said to go
through a (p+1)−cycle if the technological gap n goes through the sequence
{0,1,...,p − 1,p,0}. The value of lnQi rises by lnγp = plnγ between the
beginning and the end of a (p + 1)-cycle. Thus over any long time interval,
∆lnQi can be approximated by:
∆lnQi w
X
p≥1
#p (plnγ),
where #p is the number of (p+1)-cycles the industry has gone through over
the interval. Accordingly:
g = lim
∆t→∞
X
p≥1
µ
lim
∆t→∞
#p
∆t
¶
(plnγ),
where lim
∆t→∞
#p
∆t is the asymptotic frequency of (p+1)-cycles. This asymptotic
frequency equals the steady-state ﬂow of industries from state p to state 0,
which in turn equals the fraction µp of industries in state p times the ﬂow
probability (xp + h) that the follower catches up with the leader in such an
industry. Hence:
g =
X
p≥1
µp(xp + h)(plnγ),
14which, using the stationarity conditions (17) ∼ (19), can be rewritten as:14
g =( 2 µ0x0 +
X
k≥1
µkxk)lnγ. (G)
Equation (G) states that the growth rate equals the product of the fre-
quency of “frontier innovations” (innovations by industry leaders and neck-
and-neck ﬁrms, which advance the industry’s frontier technology) and the
(log) size of innovations. It shows one way in which neck-and-neck rivalry
promotes growth; that is, when an industry is neck and neck there are two
ﬁrms trying to advance the industry’s frontier technology, whereas in any
other state just one ﬁrm is trying. Thus if all the eﬀorts x were the same,
technology would advance on average twice as fast in a neck-and-neck in-
dustry as in any other. Moreover, as we shall see, the R&D eﬀort of a
neck-and-neck ﬁrm is typically greater than that of any leader.
14To see this, note ﬁrst that:
X
p≥1
µp · (xp + h)p =
X
p≥1
µp(xp + h)
+
X
p≥2
µp(xp + h)+
X
p≥3
µp(xp + h)+....
Now, from equation (17), we know that
X
p≥1
µp(xp + h)=2 µ0x0.
Using (17) ∼ (19), one can also straightforwardly show that:
X
p≥k
µp(xp + h)=µk−1xk−1
for all k ≥ 2. This establishes (G).k
153 Very large innovations15
In this section we discuss the special case in which the maximum permissible
l e a di so n es t e p .T h a ti s ,w ea s s u m et h a taﬁrm one step ahead of its rival
cannot perform R&D. This special case approximates what happens when
t h es i z eo fi n n o v a t i o n sγ is very large. This is because in the limit, as γ →
∞, result (7) above implies that even without the special restriction of this
section the equilibrium R&D eﬀort of the leading ﬁrm would approach zero.
That is, when γ is very large, even a one-step lead would raise the leader’s
proﬁta l m o s tt ot h em a x i m a ll e v e l( φ(γ−1,α) ' 1 for α > 0), where there is
no further incentive to innovate. This case allows maximum simplicity and
allows our results to be derived analytically.
Let Γ0 ≡ π1 − π0 and Γ−1 ≡ π0 − π1 denote respectively the incremental
proﬁt of a neck-and-neck ﬁrm and a follower. Equations (10) ∼ (12), (14)
and (15), together with the restriction that the leader’s R&D eﬀort x1 be
zero, imply that x1 and x0 are determined by:
x
2
0/2+( r + h)x0 = Γ0/β (20)
x
2
1/2+( r + h + x0)x1 = Γ−1/β + x
2
0/2( 2 1)
It follows directly from (20) that the R&D eﬀort of a neck-and-neck ﬁrm is
always increased by an increase in competition, which we have seen always
increases the incremental proﬁt Γ0, a n di sa l w a y sr e d u c e db ya ni n c r e a s ei n
the ease of imitation, which raises the eﬀective discount rate r + h.
By Proposition 1(c), Γ0 > Γ−1. It follows from this, using (20) and (21),
that a ﬁrm’s greatest R&D eﬀort occurs when it is in a neck-and-neck indus-
try:
x0 > x1. (22)
15For an analysis of this example which ﬁrst takes the proﬁt ﬂows πn and πn as primary
parameters, but then compares between Cournot and Bertrand competition and between
step-by-step and leap-frogging technological progress, we again refer the reader to Aghion
et al. (1997). Mukoyama (1999) has independently extended this analysis to look at the
eﬀects of competition with a ﬁxed labor supply, in the special case where α =1 . I nh i s
analysis, the two-state model can be exactly correct even without very large innovations
because a constant-returns R&D technology implies, for some parameter values, that the
Arrow-eﬀect dissuades technology leaders from performing R&D.
16T h es t e a d y - s t a t ee q u a t i o n( 17) implies that:
2µ0x0 = µ1(x1 + h)=( 1 − µ0)(x1 + h)
Substituting this into the growth rate equation (G) yields:
g = µ02x0 lnγ =
2x0(x1 + h)
2x0 + x1 + h
lnγ, (23)
which, together with (20) and (21), determines the steady-state growth rate
g as a function of r,h, β,Γ0 and Γ−1.
According to (23), the growth rate is proportional to the probability (µ0),
and to the total R&D eﬀort (2x0), of a neck-and-neck industry. The eﬀects
of competition (α) and imitation (h) on growth can be understood in terms
of their eﬀects on these two characteristics of a neck-and-neck industry.
An increase in product market competition always has the initial eﬀect of
raising growth; that is, holding constant the ease of imitation h, the growth
rate increases as the degree of competition α is raised above zero. This is
because when α =0e a c hﬁrm earns the same proﬁt regardless of its techno-
logical lead or lag (recall Proposition 1(b)). Thus no ﬁrm has any incentive to
innovate, and the R&D eﬀort of a neck-and-neck industry is zero.16 By rais-
ing the degree of competition above zero we make the incremental proﬁt Γ0
positive for neck-and-neck ﬁrms; this gives them a reason to innovate, namely
to escape competition, with the result that growth rises above zero.17
Whether the eﬀect of competition on growth is always positive cannot
be determined without making more assumptions. This is because, as we
pointed out in our discussion of Figure 1 above, an increase in the intensity of
competition can eventually reduce the incremental proﬁt Γ−1 of follower ﬁrms.
When this happens, then according to (21) the follower’s R&D eﬀort x1 can
fall. This can reduce the economy’s growth rate, as in other Schumpeterian
models. Speciﬁcally, it can reduce g by reducing the probability of a neck-
and-neck industry (µ0 =( x1 + h)/(2x0 + x1 + h)).
An increase in imitation eventually has the usual Schumpeterian appro-
priability eﬀect of reducing the growth rate. It does this by reducing the
16Formally, Γ0 = 0 and hence by (20), x0 =0 .
17When α > 0, then, by (9) above, Γ0 > 0a n dΓ−1 > 0, so that, by (20) and (21),
x0 > 0a n dx1 > 0; from this and (23) it follows that g>0.
17total R&D eﬀort of a neck-and-neck industry (2x0). That is, according to
(20), as h →∞ ,x 0 falls to zero. Since, by (G), 0 <g<2x0 lnγ, the growth
rate also falls to zero.
Although imitation reduces x0, it also increases the probability µ0 of a
neck-and-neck industry, by inducing more frequent catch-up. This composi-
tion eﬀect works in opposition to the usual Schumpeterian eﬀect, and tends
to raise the growth rate. Because of it, a little imitation is always good for
growth. That is, when h =0 , ∂g/∂h>0.18
Thus we see that when the size of innovations γ is large enough to make
this two-state example applicable, a little competition and a little imitation
are always good for growth, contrary to the usual Schumpeterian appropri-
ability eﬀects. Yet, in the case of imitation at least, the Schumpeterian eﬀect
is eventually valid, so that growth depends on the ease of imitation according
to an inverse-U shaped function.
4 Very small innovations
In the previous section we analysed the case where innovations were very
large, in the sense that γ was close to its upper bound of +∞. In the present
section we go to the opposite extreme: we analyze the case where innovations
are very small, in the sense that γ is close to its lower bound of 1.A s i n
Budd et al. (1993), we use the method of asymptotic expansions. In order
18To see this, note that, from (23):
∂g/∂h|h=0 =
·
2x0
x1
µ
1+
∂x1
∂h
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
h=0
¶
+
x1
x0
∂x0
∂h
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
h=0
¸"
2x0x1 lnγ
(2x0 + x1)
2
#
, (24)
and from (20):
∂x0
∂h
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
h=0
= −
x0
x0 + r
. (25)
From (21) and (25):
∂x1
∂h
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
h=0
= −
x1 +( x0 − x1) x0
x0+r
x0 + x1 + r
. (26)
From (24) ∼ (26):
∂g/∂h|h=0 ∼
2x0
x1
(x0 + r)
2 − (x0 − x1)x0
x0 + x1 + r
− x1. (27)
It can be shown, using (22), that the right-hand side of (27) is positive.k
18to cover the whole range of values of α,w en e e dt od e r i v et w od i ﬀerent sets
of expansions: one that is valid for α in any compact subinterval S of [0,1);
and one that is valid for α = 1. This is because, as indicated by results (6)
and (9) above, the proﬁtf u n c t i o nφ(·,α)i ss m o o t hw h e nα < 1, but has a
kink at 1 when α = 1. By combining these expansions, we obtain a complete
picture of the way growth varies with h and α.
4.1 The case α < 1
Suppose that α < 1.P u tε = γ − 1. Then, as we show in the Appendix, the
value functions can be approximated by the expansions
Vn =
φ(1,α)
r
+ nβηε+O
¡
ε
2¢
, (28)
V0 =
φ(1,α)
r
+O
¡
ε
2¢
(29)
and
V n =
φ(1,α)
r
− nβηε+O
¡
ε
2¢
, (30)
where
η =
1
β (r + h)
µ
−
∂φ(1,α)
∂z
¶
> 0. (31)
Moreover the probability µ0 of the neck-and-neck state can be approximated
by the expansion
µ0 = b µ0 +O( ε), (32)
where
b µ0 =
1
1 +2 f
³
h
ηε
´ (33)
and
f (ζ) ≡
∞ X
k=2
(
1
2+ζ
...
1
k + ζ
).19.
A useful property of this function f (ζ), which we establish in the appendix,
is that:
−1 <
ζf0(ζ)
f (ζ)
< 0. (34)
19One can actually reexpress this function as: f (ζ) ≡
R 1
0 e1−yy1+ζdy.
19For our purposes, the most important aspect of the expansions for the
values is that they are linear in the lead-size n. Since the incentive for a
leader or a neck-and-neck ﬁrm to innovate depends on the incremental value
from going ahead one step, this linearity means that when γ is small each of
these ﬁrms will spend approximately the same on R&D. Since the incentive
for a follower to innovate depends on the diﬀerence between the value of being
even and the value of being behind n steps, the same linearity means that
when γ is small the follower’s R&D eﬀort will be approximately proportional
to n.I no t h e rw o r d s :
xn =( Vn+1 − Vn)/β = ηε+O
¡
ε
2¢
, (35)
x0 =( V1 − V0)/β = ηε+O
¡
ε
2¢
(36)
and
xn =
¡
V0 − V n
¢
/β = nηε+O
¡
ε
2¢
. (37)
Now, we have
g =
Ã
2µ0x0 +
∞ X
n=1
µnxn
!
lnγ
(by equation (G))
=
Ã
µ0x0 +
∞ X
n=0
µnxn
!
lnγ
(rearranging)
=
Ã
(b µ0 +O( ε))
¡
ηε+O
¡
ε
2¢¢
+
∞ X
n=0
µn
¡
ηε+O
¡
ε
2¢¢
!
¡
ε +O
¡
ε
2¢¢
(using the expansion (32) for µ0, the expansions (35-36) for the xn and the
fact that lnγ = ε +O( ε2))
=
¡
(b µ0 +O( ε))
¡
ηε+O
¡
ε
2¢¢
+
¡
ηε+O
¡
ε
2¢¢¢¡
ε +O
¡
ε
2¢¢
(because
P∞
n=0 µn = 1)
=( 1 + b µ0)ηε
2 +O
¡
ε
3¢
.
According to this equation, the growth rate in the neighborhood of γ = 1
is proportional to the product of: (i) one plus the probability of a neck-
and-neck industry 1 + b µ0; and (ii) the R&D eﬀort ηε of a neck-and-neck
20ﬁrm. Thus, once again, growth is increased by any parameter change that
increases either of these characteristics of a neck-and-neck industry. The
neck-and-neck state is critical in this case because although each leader’s
R&D eﬀort is approximately the same as a neck-and-neck ﬁrm’s, there are
two frontier innovators in the neck-and-neck state. Therefore the frontier
technology advances twice as fast in the neck-and-neck industry as in any
other industry.
Consider an increase in the degree of competition α.E q u a t i o n s( 9 )a n d
(31) together imply that
∂η
∂α > 0. It follows that the approximate R&D eﬀort
ηε of each neck-and-neck ﬁrm is increasing in α.T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
what we conjectured when discussing Figure 1, namely that the incentive
to innovate (incremental value) of a neck-and-neck ﬁrm is increasing in the
degree of product-market competition. On the other hand, equation (33)
and the fact that f0 < 0 together imply that
∂b µ0
∂η < 0. It follows that the
approximate probability b µ0 of the neck-and-neck state is decreasing in α.T h e
increase in neck-and-neck R&D eﬀort is therefore counteracted by a negative
composition eﬀect. Finally, substituting for b µ0 from (33), we have
(1 + b µ0)ηε =
2
³
1 + f
³
h
ηε
´´
h
ηε
³
1 +2 f
³
h
ηε
´´h. (38)
Moreover, using the fact that
ζf0(ζ)
f(ζ) > −1,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
2(1+f(ζ))
ζ(1+2f(ζ))
is decreasing in ζ.T h e o v e r a l l e ﬀect of an increase in α is therefore an
increase in growth. In particular, there is no evidence of a Schumpeterian
appropriability eﬀect of competition on growth.
Consider now the eﬀect of an increase in the intensity of imitation h.
Equation (31) implies that
∂η
∂h < 0. It follows that the approximate R&D
eﬀort ηε of each neck-and-neck ﬁrm is decreasing in h. This is the usual
Schumpeterian eﬀect of increasing the intensity of imitation. On the other
hand, equation (31) implies that h
ηε is increasing in h. Equation (33) and
the fact that f0 < 0 then implies that
∂b µ0
∂h > 0. The decrease in neck-and-
neck R&D eﬀort is therefore counteracted by a positive composition eﬀect.
Finally, it is easy to verify that the right-hand side of equation (38): (i)
converges to a strictly positive limit as h → 0+; (ii) has a strictly positive
21derivative with respect to h at h = 0; and (iii) converges to 0 as h → +∞.
These simple observations suggest that, as in the case of large innovations,
the approximate growth rate is inverse-U shaped with respect to h:t h e
composition eﬀect of forcing ﬁrms more frequently into the R&D-intensive
neck-and-neck state will cause g to increase when h ﬁrst rises above zero,
but the usual Schumpeterian appropriability eﬀect will eventually cause g to
decrease when h continues to increase.
4.2 The case α = 1
Suppose now that α = 1.P u tε = γ − 1 as before, and put
ψ =
1
β (r + h)
.
Then, as we show in the Appendix: the approximate linearity in n of the
proﬁt function for a leader implies that
Vn = nβψε+O
¡
ε
2¢
; (39)
and the fact that only a leader earns a positive proﬁt implies that
V0 =O
¡
ε
2¢
(40)
and
V n =O
¡
ε
2¢
. (41)
Moreover the probability µ0 of the neck-and-neck state can be approximated
by the expansion
µ0 = e µ0 +O( ε),
where
e µ0 =
1
1 +2
ψε
h
. (42)
Hence, to the ﬁrst order, only leaders and neck-and-neck ﬁrms perform
R&D, and all at the same rate:
xn = ψε+O
¡
ε
2¢
,
x0 = ψε+O
¡
ε
2¢
22and
xn =O
¡
ε
2¢
.
Moreover the approximate growth rate can be expressed in terms of the
neck-and-neck eﬀort x0 and frequency e µ0:
g =( 1 + e µ0)ψε
2 +O
¡
ε
3¢
.
Now: ψε is decreasing in h; e µ0 is increasing in h; and we have
(1 + e µ0)ψε =
2
¡
1 +
ψε
h
¢
h
ψε
¡
1 +2
ψε
h
¢h. (43)
Finally, it is easy to verify that the right-hand side of equation (43): (i)
converges to a strictly positive limit as h → 0+; (ii) has a strictly positive
derivative with respect to h at h = 0 (because the partial derivative with
respect to h generates the dominant term); and (iii) converges to 0 as h →
+∞.
4.3 Comparing the two approximations
In order to determine how g varies globally with α, we can compare the two
quantities
g0 (h,α)=
2
³
1 + f
³
h
ηε
´´
h
ηε
³
1 +2 f
³
h
ηε
´´h
and
g1 (h)=
2
¡
1 +
ψε
h
¢
h
ψε
¡
1 +2
ψε
h
¢h.
We have
2
³
1 + f
³
h
ηε
´´
1 +2 f
³
h
ηε
´ <
2
³
1 +2 f
³
h
ηε
´´
1 +2 f
³
h
ηε
´ =2
and
2
¡
1 +
ψε
h
¢
1 +2
ψε
h
>
2
¡
1 +
ψε
h
¢
2+2
ψε
h
= 1.
Hence
g0 (h,α)
g1 (h)
<
2η
ψ
= −2
∂φ(1,α)
∂z
.
Moreover (9) tells us that limα→1−
∂φ(1,α)
∂z = −1
3.H e n c el i m α→1−
g0(h,α)
g1(h) ≤ 2
3.
In other words, when γ is small enough, growth is monotonically increasing
in α on the entire interval [0,1].
234.4 The global picture
At this point we have found an approximation for the growth rate for all
h ∈ (0,+∞)a n da l lα ∈ [0,1]. Moreover: we have shown that, for all
h ∈ (0,+∞), the approximate growth rate is increasing in α ∈ [0,1]w i t h
an upward jump at α = 1; and we have argued that, for all α ∈ [0,1], the
approximate growth rate is inverse-U shaped with respect to h ∈ (0,+∞).
Figure 2 depicts the approximate growth rate, as a function of α and h,
for the case where ε =0 .0001 and where all other parameters are taken from
the baseline case to be described in the following section. The monotonicity
with respect to α, the inverse-U shape with respect to h,a n dt h eu p w a r d
jump at α = 1 are all apparent from this ﬁgure. The actual growth rate,
as computed from the general model according to the procedures described
in the following section, is also shown in Figure 2. This indicates that the
combined expansions provide a very close approximation to the actual growth
rate, and conﬁrms the above eﬀects of competition and imitation.
Figure 2 here
To summarize, in the case of very small innovations, the usual Schum-
peterian appropriability eﬀect of competition on growth vanishes entirely:
growth is always enhanced by more competition, because more competition
raises the incentive for a ﬁrm to escape competition by innovating. Also,
as in the case of large innovations, the growth rate depends on the ease
of imitation according to an inverse-U shaped relationship: more imitation
eventually has the Schumpeterian eﬀect of reducing growth, but it always
has the initial eﬀect of raising growth by promoting neck-and-neck rivalry.
5T h e g e n e r a l c a s e
In this section we analyse the general case in which there is no restriction on
the size of innovations. We begin by noting that two of the results demon-
strated in the previous sections extend easily to the general case. First, a
little competition is always good for growth. This is because when the de-
gree of competition is minimal (α =0 ) ,aﬁrm’s value is independent of its
24technological lead; as we have seen, it always earns a proﬁte q u a lt o1/2.
Thus no ﬁrm has an incentive to perform R&D, equations (10) ∼ (15) yield
xn = xn =0f o ra l ln, and the steady-state growth rate is zero. When the
degree of competition rises a little above zero however, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt depends
positively on the size of its technological lead, so that leaders and neck-and-
neck ﬁrms have an incentive to perform at least some R&D, given that the
marginal cost of R&D is zero when R&D eﬀort is zero. Thus according to
the growth equation (G) the growth rate will be positive when the degree of
competition rises above zero.20
The other aspect of our main result that generalizes easily is that a lot of
imitation is bad for growth. If the ease of imitation h approaches inﬁnity, any
lead that a ﬁrm might establish vanishes almost instantaneously, reducing
the erstwhile leader’s proﬁtb a c kt oπ0. This eliminates any incentive for
leaders and neck-and-neck ﬁrms to perform R&D. Likewise it eliminates any
incentive for followers to perform R&D, since they would soon catch up even
without any such eﬀort. Formally, as h approaches inﬁnity, the values V0, Vn
and V n determined by (10) ∼ (15) all approach the same limit π0/r, and the
equilibrium R&D eﬀorts x0, xn and xn all approach zero. Hence the growth
rate determined by (G) approaches zero.
This leaves unanswered the questions of whether a little imitation might
raise growth, and whether a lot of competition might reduce growth. To
address these questions in the general case we solve the model numerically.
To deal with the inﬁnite number of states n we ﬁrst suppose provisionally
that once a ﬁrm’s lead reaches a ﬁnite upper limit N it can no longer perform
R&D. This limits to N the number of states with positive probability in the
steady-state distribution and reduces (10) ∼ (15) to a ﬁnite system21 that can
be solved numerically. We then increase N until the steady-state probability
of a lead size within 10 percent of N has fallen below 10−3.
In the numerical analysis we ﬁx the rate of interest at22 r = .03, and
20The appendix shows formally that if α > 0a n dh>0t h e ng>0.
21When N = 1 the system is exactly that of Section 3.
22Since the numeraire is consumer expenditures and the wage rate equals unity, (footnote
6 above) therefore r is a labor rate of interest. The more conventional real rate of interest
is r + g, which in the benchmark case equals .05.
25consider a range of values for the size of innovations γ. The only other
parameter of the model other than α and h is the slope β of the marginal
R&D-cost function. We ﬁrst consider a benchmark case in which γ and β
a r ec h o s e nt om a k et h ea v e r a g eg r o w t hr a t eo v e ra l lv a l u e so fα equal to 0.02
and the average fraction of GDP spent on R&D over all values of α equal
to 0.025, when h =0 . Thus the benchmark case is calibrated roughly to
the US post-war economy with the time unit interpreted as one year. It has
γ = 1.135 and β =0 .8. We hold β ﬁxed at this level when we vary γ above
and below its benchmark value.
Figure 3 depicts a ﬁrm’s value at various leads, normalized so that its
neck-and-neck value is zero (Vn−V0 when n ≥ 0, and V −n−V0 when n<0).
It is plotted against the degree of competition α in panel (a) and against the
ease of imitation h in panel (b). Evidently the value function inherits much
of its shape from the proﬁt function. Speciﬁcally, its slope with respect to n
is positive but vanishes as α falls to zero. The slope also falls uniformly as
the ease of imitation h increases. The curvature of the logistic with respect
to n increases with α, and the value of catching up (V0 − V −n for n<0) is
small for extreme values of α.
Figure 3 here
Since the slope of the value function measures a leader’s incentive to
innovate, the fact that it is maximal around the neck-and-neck point makes
the neck-and-neck state especially important quantitatively; neck-and-neck
ﬁrms perform R&D at a higher intensity than industry leaders. Thus a
greater degree of competition will tend to raise growth by sharpening the
logistic shape of the value function and thereby raising the incentive for
ﬁrms in the critical neck-and-neck state to perform R&D.
Figure 4 depicts a ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort at various leads. It shows that,
in accordance with our discussion in the previous paragraph, a neck-and-
neck ﬁrm (with n = 0) does more R&D than a leader ﬁrm (with n>0).
As the degree of competition rises the R&D eﬀort of neck-and-neck ﬁrms
increases. The eﬀect of increasing α on R&D by followers (ﬁrms with n<0)
is ﬁrst positive but then negative, because the value of catching up is small
26for extreme values of α. However, a follower’s R&D eﬀort does not vanish
when α = 1 because even though the follower’s immediate proﬁt cannot be
increased by catching up, the prospect of taking the lead is enhanced by
catching up. The eﬀect of increasing the ease of imitation h is to dampen all
R&D eﬀorts, because it reduces the slope of the value function.
Figure 4 here
Figure 5 depicts the steady-state distribution of technological leads. As
α increases, the probability of neck-and-neck rivalry (n = 0) diminishes
steadily. One reason for this is that, as we have seen, the incentive of neck-
and-neck ﬁrms to perform R&D increases, and hence the rate at which in-
dustries exit the neck-and-neck state increases. Another reason that applies
for large values of α is that, as we have also seen, the incentive for a follower
to catch up diminishes as the degree of competition gets very large, because
of the usual Schumpeterian eﬀect of a reduced prospect of immediate neck-
and-neck proﬁt in the event that the R&D results in an innovation. For both
of these reasons, an increase in α reduces the probability of the critical neck-
and-neck state in which so much R&D takes place, and hence it can possibly
reduce growth.
Figure 5 here
Increases in h shift the distribution so that it becomes increasingly con-
centrated on the neck-and-neck state. By putting ﬁrms more often into the
state with the highest frequency of frontier innovation this increase in imita-
tion can possibly increase the growth rate. Note that the rate at which an
increase in h increases the probability of n = 0 is greatest when h =0 . This
makes it more likely that the growth-enhancing industry-composition eﬀect
of increased imitation dominates when h is small than when the probability
is already near unity.
Figure 6 depicts the steady-state growth rate g f o rf o u rd i ﬀerent values of
γ ranging from 1. 0 3t o4 .W eh a v ee x a m i n e dal a r g en u m b e ro fo t h e rc a s e s
(including cases with other values of r and β) without ﬁnding any exceptions
to the inferences reported below. Figure 6 veriﬁes our proposition that g
27is always increasing initially with respect to the degree of competition α.
It also shows however that when innovations are very large and the ease of
imitation is not too large, the industry-composition eﬀect of an increase in
the degree of competition can eventually reduce the growth rate if h is held
constant.
Figure 6 here
These numerical results argue strongly against the Schumpeterian propo-
sition that competition reduces growth. For the only cases in which we have
observed such an overall eﬀect occur when γ is far too large to ﬁtt h ef a c t s
concerning growth and R&D expenditures. Moreover, as Figure 6 indicates,
if we allow h and α to be chosen together then the growth-maximizing value
of α is always unity. That is, the degree of competition must be maximal in
order to achieve the highest possible growth rate.
Figure 6 also corroborates our argument that g is eventually reduced by
raising the ease of imitation. Also, in most cases g is initially increasing in
h. Thus once again the industry-composition eﬀect of putting ﬁrms more of-
ten into the R&D-intensive state of neck-and-neck rivalry appears to be the
dominant one when the ease of imitation is not already too large. This does
not hold true however, in cases where the degree of competition α is very
large and γ is not too large. In these cases an increase in the ease of imita-
tion always has the Schumpeterian eﬀect, even initially, of reducing growth
in the limiting case of perfect competition (α = 1).23 Thus the contradic-
tion of Schumpeter that we found analytically in the ﬁrst two sections when
characterizing the initial eﬀect of h is tempered by the numerical analysis.
6 Concluding remarks
We have already summarized our results in the introduction to the paper.
Here we comment on some among the many possible extensions to the paper’s
analysis.24 The ﬁrst relaxes our assumption to the eﬀe c tt h a taf o l l o w e r ’ se a s e
23We have veriﬁed numerically that these initial negative eﬀects of h are not always
artifacts of the discrete grid for h used in the calculations underlying Figure 6.
24The ﬁrst two extensions have been suggested by a referee, to whom we are very
grateful.
28of imitation and R&D-cost function are independent of the technological gap
n to be made up. It might be more realistic to assume that the further
behind the follower becomes, the lower the ease of imitation and the higher
the R&D-cost schedule.
We have investigated this possibility by assuming that the catch-up haz-
ard rate of a ﬁrm that is n steps behind the industry leader is (xn + h)e−ξn,
ξ > 0. Numerical analysis of this alternative model shows that, compared to
the base model of the present paper, leaders and neck-and-neck ﬁrms do more
R&D because of the extra marginal beneﬁt that comes from making it more
diﬃcult for the follower to catch up, while followers do less R&D because
of the extra cost. The main eﬀect on industry composition is to reduce the
relative probability of the critical neck-and-neck state, as one would expect
from the changed R&D eﬀorts.
This modiﬁcation expands the region of parameter space over which the
eﬀect of competition on growth is negative, because now as α increases,
holding h constant, the encouraging eﬀect on neck-and-neck R&D is even
stronger than before, which means that one reaches the point sooner than
before where the steady-state probability µ0 of neck-and-neck rivalry is so
low that the growth-reducing decrease in µ0 is the dominant eﬀect. The
reduction of µ0 also makes it more likely that an increase in the ease of
imitation will have a positive overall eﬀe c to ng r o w t hb e c a u s ei to ﬀsets the
fall in µ0. Otherwise the qualitative results of the numerical analysis are the
same as reported above.
The second possible extension relaxes the assumption implicit in the
above analysis to the eﬀect that a successful innovator automatically imple-
ments the innovation. This assumption precludes the leader from following
a strategy of shelving a successful innovation in order to keep the follower
from learning the technological details by examining the product. If a fol-
lower’s ability to catch up were not dependent on seeing the product, say
because industrial secrecy laws were lax, then this strategy would not be
used anyway, and our implicit assumption would be innocuous. But in gen-
eral it might make more sense for us to allow ﬁrms the shelving option, and
to suppose that when a follower catches up, it catches up not to the leader’s
29latest innovation but to the most advanced technology that the leader has
implemented.
It can be shown that under this alternative assumption the shelving op-
tion would not be exercised in equilibrium in the two-state example of section
3 above. But in the general case, numerical analysis shows that it can indeed
be an equilibrium strategy, although never for a ﬁrm whose latest innovation
is only one step ahead of the follower. Our investigations of this extension
have not so far changed any of the conclusions reported above.
A third extension is to consider the case of non-unit elastic industry
demand functions. The conclusion that an increase in α is almost always
growth-enhancing, which came out of both our asymptotic expansions and
our simulations, should, by continuity, carry over to the case where demand
functions are almost unit-elastic. Furthermore, preliminary investigation of
the case where industry demand functions are more than unit elastic25,c o n -
ﬁrms the inverted U-shaped eﬀect of α on g which we had already found in
the basic unit-elastic case analyzed above. Indeed, the greater the elasticity
of industry demand, the greater the incentive response of a neck-and-neck
ﬁrm to an increase in α: innovating will allow a neck-and-neck ﬁrm not only
to move ahead of its competitor in the same industry, but also to steal more
business from other sectors in the economy. This extra incentive to innovate,
in turn, implies that as α increases one should get sooner to the point where
the composition eﬀect of further increasing α, dominates the direct incentive
eﬀect, at which point the correlation between α and g becomes negative.26
25More speciﬁcally, we have investigated the case where the intertemporal utility func-
tion of the representative consumer, is given by:
U =
Z ∞
0
e−rt{lnCt − L(t)}dt,
where, for all t:
Ct =(
Z 1
0
Q
β
i )
1
β;β ∈ (0,1),
which in turn corresponds to an elasticity of industry demand equal to: 1
1−β > 1. (Our
analysis so far has concentrated on the unit-elastic case where β =0 ) . In this extension
of our model, within- (resp. across-) industry product market competition is measured by
α(resp. β).
26On the other hand, an increase in β would appear to increase the R&D incentives of
technological leaders in all industries but to a larger extent in neck and neck sectors, with
30Another direction in which the work in this paper could be taken, is to an-
alyze the interplay between competition (anti-trust) policy and patent policy.
Whilst earlier Schumpeterian models of endogenous growth and also much of
the existing IO literature on competition and innovation, share the implica-
tion that anti-trust policy would essentially oﬀset the innovation-enhancing
eﬀects of patent policy by reducing the rents accruing to successful inno-
vators, our model in this paper suggests that the two kinds of policy may
a c t u a l l ye n du pb e i n go f t e ncomplementary in fostering R&D and growth.
Indeed, we found both, that when we allow for both PMC and imitation the
maximal growth rate is achieved by allowing the maximal degree of product
market competition, and at the same time that too much imitation is always
bad for growth. Exploring this complementarity and its implications for the
design and conduct of anti-trust policy in high-tech industries, appears to be
an important topic for future research.
Finally, we note that the model can serve as a basis for further empirical
work on the relationship(s) between product market competition, imitation
and productivity growth. For example, we have seen that PMC is most likely
to reduce growth when it is already very intense initially. This prediction
seems to be conﬁrmed by recent empirical work by Blundell et al. (1995),
which ﬁnds that the correlation between PMC and growth is more posi-
tive in more concentrated industries. More generally, whether the positive
correlation between PMC and growth can be explained more convincingly
by the “escape competition” eﬀect analyzed in this paper than by agency
considerations27 or mobility eﬀects28 remains the subject of further empirical
research.
ac o r r e s p o n d i n ge ﬀect on aggregate growth which again should be positive or inverted
U-shaped.
27See Nickell et al. (1997), and Aghion et al. (1999).
28See Aghion and Howitt (1996).
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33Appendix
First we prove Proposition 1.D e ﬁne z ≡ cA/cB and λ ≡ λA. Take any
α ∈ (0,1). From (2):
λ =
1
1 +
³
pA
pB
´ α
1−α
. (A1)
From (3) and the fact that λA + λB = 1:
pA
pB
=
(1 − αλ)λz
(1 − α(1 − λ))(1 − λ)
. (A2)
Eliminating
pA
pB from (A1) and (A2) and rearranging yields:
(1 − αλ)
α λz
α =( 1 − α(1 − λ))
α (1 − λ),
or, in logs:
αln(1 − αλ)+l n( λ) − αln(1 − α(1 − λ)) − ln(1 − λ)+αln(z)=0 ( A 3 )
Let F (λ) denote the left-hand side of (A3), and note that:
F
0 (λ)=G(1,λ) − G(α,λ),
where the function G is deﬁned as:
G(a,λ) ≡
a2
1 − a(1 − λ)
+
a2
1 − aλ
.
Since ∂G(a,λ)/∂a>0f o ra l l( a,λ) ∈ (0,1)
2, therefore:
F
0 (λ) > 0f o ra l lλ ∈ (0,1). (A4)
It follows from (A3), (A4) and the implicit function theorem that the
equilibrium value of λA is given by a function λ(z,α) that is strictly decreas-
ing in z, a n dw h o s er a n g el i e si n( 0 ,1). By symmetry, λB = λ(1/z,α), and
since λA + λB = 1 :
λ(1,α)=1/2. (A5)
T h u sa c c o r d i n gt o( 4 ) ,t h ep r o ﬁt function is:
φ(z,α)=
λ(z,α)(1 − α)
1 − αλ(z,α)
. (A6)
34Part (a) of the Proposition follows from (A6) and the fact that λ(·) is strictly
decreasing in z.
It follows directly from (A3) that λ(z,0) = 1/2. Part (b) follows from
this and (A6).
To show part (c), suppose wnlog that z<1, so that λ > 1/2. Then from
(A5) and (A6):
φ(z,α)+φ(1/z,α) − 2φ(1,α)=( 1 − α)(H(λ) − H(1/2)),
where the function H (·)i sd e ﬁned as:
H (λ)=
λ
1 − αλ
+
1 − λ
1 − α(1 − λ)
.
Part (c) follows from the fact that H0 (λ)=
¡
1
1−αλ
¢2 −
³
1
1−α(1−λ)
´2
> 0w h e n
λ > 1/2.k
Next, we demonstrate results (6) ∼ (9). Result (6) follows from routine
analysis of Bertrand competition with homogeneous products. It follows from
(A3) that
λ(0,α)=1 and lim
z→∞
λ(z,α)=0 .
Result (7) follows from this and (A6). Result (8) follows from (A5) and (A6).
Result (9) follows from direct diﬀerentiation of (A3) and (A6), using (A5).k
N e x t ,w ed e r i v et h eT a y l o r - s e r i e sa p p r o x i m a t i o n s( 2 8 )∼ (30) to the value
functions for the case α < 1. Taking into account that a ﬁrm with lead n
has a proﬁt φ(γ−n,α), and recalling that γ = 1 + ε, we have the following
ﬁrst-order approximations to the proﬁt ﬂows:
π0 = φ(1,α), (A7)
πn = φ(1,α) − n[∂φ(1,α)/∂z]ε +O
¡
ε
2¢
(A8)
and
πn = φ(1,α)+n[∂φ(1,α)/∂z]ε +O
¡
ε
2¢
. (A9)
The Bellman equations (10) ∼ (12) can be written, using the policy functions
(13) ∼ (15), as:
βrV0 = βπ0 +( V1 − V0)
2/2+( V 1 − V0)(V1 − V0), (A10)
35βrVn = βπn +( Vn+1 − Vn)
2/2+( V0 − Vn)(V0 − V n)+βh(V0 − Vn)( A 11)
and
βrV n = βπn+(V0−V n)
2/2+(V n+1−V n)(Vn+1−Vn)+βh(V0−V n). (A12)
Equations (28) ∼ (30) follow from replacing the proﬁt ﬂows in (A10) ∼ (A12)
by their ﬁrst-order approximations (A7) ∼ (A9), and using the method of
undetermined coeﬃcients.
To derive the Taylor-series approximations (39) ∼ (41) to the value func-
tions for the case α = 1, ﬁrst note that in this case equation (6) implies that
the proﬁt ﬂows can be approximated by:
π0 =O
¡
ε
2¢
, πn =O
¡
ε
2¢
and
πn = nε +O
¡
ε
2¢
.
Then use these approximations to replace the proﬁt ﬂows in (A10) ∼ (A12)
and again use the method of undetermined coeﬃcients.k
Next, we derive the approximation (33) to the probability of a neck-and-
neck state when γ is small. In view of the approximations (35) ∼ (37) for
eﬀort, equations (16), (18) and (19) for the steady-state probabilities µn can
be approximated by:
∞ X
n=0
b µn = 1,
b µ1 (2η + θ)=2 b µ0η,
b µ2 (3η + θ)=b µ1η,
b µ3 (4η + θ)=b µ2η,
...
where θ = h/ε. The latter equations can be solved recursively for b µ1, b µ2, b µ3,...
in terms of b µ0.D o i n gs oy i e l d s :
1 =
∞ X
n=0
b µn
36=
µ
1
2
+
η
2η + θ
+
η
2η + θ
η
3η + θ
+
η
2η + θ
η
3η + θ
η
4η + θ
+ ...
¶
2b µ0,
which can be rewritten as (33), where:
f (ζ)=
1
(2 + ζ)
+
1
(2 + ζ)(3+ζ)
+
1
(2 + ζ)(3+ζ)(4+ζ)
+ ...>0. (A13)
We then have:
f
0 (ζ)=−
1
(2 + ζ)
2 −
1
(2 + ζ)
2 (3 + ζ)
−
1
(2 + ζ)
2 (3 + ζ)(4+ζ)
− ...
−
1
(2 + ζ)(3+ζ)
2 −
1
(2 + ζ)(3+ζ)
2 (4 + ζ)
− ...
−
1
(2 + ζ)(3+ζ)(4+ζ)
2 − ...
...
< 0.
That is:
f
0 (ζ)=−
f (ζ)
(2 + ζ)
−
f (ζ + 1)
(2 + ζ)(3+ζ)
−
f (ζ +2 )
(2 + ζ)(3+ζ)(4+ζ)
− ...
> −f (ζ)
µ
1
(2 + ζ)
+
1
(2 + ζ)(3+ζ)
+
1
(2 + ζ)(3+ζ)(4+ζ)
+ ...
¶
= −f (ζ)
2 .
Therefore:
0 ≥
ζf0 (ζ)
f (ζ)
≥− ζf (ζ). (A14)
From (A13):
0 <f(ζ) <
1
2
+
1
(2 + ζ)
+
1
(2 + ζ)
2 +
1
(2 + ζ)
3 + ...=
1
1 + ζ
.
Therefore:
0 ≤ ζf (ζ) ≤
ζ
1 + ζ
< 1;( A 15)
From (A14) and (A15):
0 ≥
ζf0 (ζ)
f (ζ)
> −1.k
Next, we establish that if α > 0a n dh>0t h e ng>0, as promised in
footnote 20. In this case, µ0 > 0, for otherwise equations (18) and (19) would
37imply that µn =0f o ra l ln>0, contradicting (16 ) .S oa c c o r d i n gt o( G )w e
need only show that x0 > 0. To do this suppose on the contrary that x0 =0 .
Then by (10) and (13):
rV1 ≥ π1 +( x1 + h)(V0 − V1), (A16)
whereas by (12) and Proposition 1(a):
rV0 = π0 < π1. (A17)
From (A16) and (A17) V1 >V 0, which together with (15) implies x0 > 0.k
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FIGURE 5. The steady-state distribution of technological leads n, when ƒ = 1.135. In panel (a) the 
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